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Abstract: This study conducts experiments to determine the modes of communication that 
are able to produce and sustain collusion and how the efficacy of communication depends 
on market structure. Two communication treatments are considered: non-binding price 
announcements and unrestricted written communication. We find that price announcements 
are conducive to coordinating on a high price but only under duopoly and when firms are 
symmetric. The standard experimental finding that collusion without communication is rare 
when there are more than two firms is shown to be robust to allowing firms to make price 
announcements. When firms are asymmetric, price announcements do result in higher 
prices but there is little evidence that firms are coordinating their behavior. When firms are 
allowed to engage in unrestricted written communication, coordination on high prices 
occurs for all market structures. We find that the incremental value to express 
communication (compared to price announcements) is greater when firms  
are asymmetric and there are more firms. 
Highlights 
 Price announcements produce coordinated pricing but only for symmetric duopoly.  
 Price announcements produce higher but unstable prices with asymmetric duopoly.  
 Incremental value of express communication is greater when firms are asymmetric.  
Keywords: Collusion, price announcements, experiments 
JEL Codes: L1, L4 
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1 Introduction 
For firms to successfully collude, they must coordinate their behavior, and coordination 
requires some form of communication. In practice, this communication can involve tacking on 
a few digits to a multi-million dollar bid as in the FCC spectrum auction (Cramton 
and Schwartz, 2000) or announcing future intended prices as in the market for air travel  
(Borenstein, 2004) or unilaterally announcing a pricing strategy as in the truck rental  
market
1
 or sitting in a hotel room and talking about prices and sales quotas as in the lysine 
market (Eichenwald, 2000). While the last mode of communication is presumably the most 
effective, it is also the most clearly unlawful. Firms interested in jointly raising prices face 
a tension in that communication which is more likely to result in coordination may also be 
more likely to result in prosecution. Hence, they may choose to more indirectly 
communicate when it is sufficient to produce at least some collusion. 
This trade-off raises two questions that we examine here. First, what are the various forms 
of communication that can produce coordinated collusive outcomes? In particular, how 
indirect can communication be and still be reasonably effective? This question is central to 
antitrust and competition law and, in spite of a legion of legal cases that speak to what 
practices are and are not lawful, there remains a large gray area where legality is unclear.
2
 
Second, how does the answer to the first question depend on the structure of 
the market? 
These questions are notoriously difficult to examine theoretically because the equilib -
rium framework cannot speak to the issue of how firms coordinate in moving from one 
equilibrium to another which is exactly what is at issue here: What forms of communica-
tion will result in firms coordinating a move from a static equilibrium with competit ive 
prices to a dynamic equilibrium with supracompetitive prices? Experimental methods 
offer a comparative advantage in that subjects engage in exactly the dynamic process of 
coordination that we are trying to understand. While the subjects are college students and 
not managers - and thus extrapolating from experiments to market behavior is always a 
precarious leap - experimental methods have more promise than other methods for 
shedding light on the effectiveness of various communication practices in producing 
collusion. 
The specific form of those two questions are addressed here as follows. In practice, two 
commonly observed methods of communication for coordinating firm behavior are advance 
price announcements (as arose in the ATPCO airlines cases) and unrestricted communication 
using natural language (as practiced by hard core cartels; for example, lysine, vitamins, and 
fine arts auction houses).
3
 To assess the relative efficacy of different modes of 
communication, the research plan is to compare outcomes when sellers can make price 
announcements with when they cannot, and to compare unrestricted communication (through 
online chat) with price announcements. When are price announcements effec- 
1Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of Valassis Communications, Inc., File No. 051 0008,  
Docket No. C-4160, April 28, 2006. 
2Kaplow (2013) delivers an excellent discussion of the boundaries of unlawful collusion.  
3The ATPCO case is covered in Borenstein (2004), while many hard core cartels are discussed in  
Harrington (2006) and Marshall and Marx (2012). 
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tive at producing collusion? When is unrestricted communication particularly effective in 
producing collusion relative to price announcements? Answers to these questions will shed 
light on when we can expect firms to engage in the most egregious form of collusion - 
involving unrestricted communication - and when they will instead choose less express 
methods. In considering the relative efficacy of these different forms of communication, 
market structure is varied in terms of the extent of firm heterogeneity and the number of 
sellers. While unrestricted communication is surely expected to be more effective than price 
announcements, less clear is how the incremental value of unrestricted communica- 
tion depends on market structure. 
Our main findings are that firms are able to coordinate on a high price with price 
announcements but only for duopoly and when firms are symmetric. When there are more 
than two firms, it is a widely-documented experimental finding that collusion is rare 
without communication and we find that result robust to allowing firms to make price 
announcements. While price announcements do result in higher prices for an asymmetric 
duopoly, there is little evidence that they are coordinating their behavior in the sense of 
acting consistent with a collusive equilibrium. When firms engage in unrestricted commu-
nication, coordination on high prices occurs whether firms are symmetric or asymmetric 
and regardless of the number of firms. 
Section 2 provides a brief summary of experimental work pertinent to the current 
study. Section 3 describes the experimental design as well as the theoretical model un -
derlying the experiment. The results from the experiments are described and discussed 
in Section 4. 
2 Literature Review 
Pertinent to this paper are past studies that experimentally examine how the frequency and 
extent of supracompetitive outcomes depend on: 1) the method of communication between 
firms about price or quantity intentions; and 2) firm heterogeneity. There is a voluminous 
literature addressing the first issue, while the set of experiments addressing the second issue 
is relatively sparse. There are no experiments that address the interaction of communication 
and firm heterogeneity, which is the primary focus of the current study. We provide here a 
brief summary of results from previous experiments, and an extensive review is available in 
our working paper (Harrington, Hernan-Gonzalez, and Kujal, 2013). Previous surveys of 
the experimental literature on communication of intentions in an oligopoly include Cason 
(2008), Normann (2008), Haan, Schoonbeek, and Winkel (2009), 
and Potters (2009). 
The communication protocols used in past oligopoly experiments can be partitioned 
into four categories. In all of these cases, the announcements made by subjects are non -
binding. A Simple Price Announcement protocol involves one or more subjects an-
nouncing a price and, in some experiments, subjects responding to an announcement by 
affirming or rejecting it. An Iterative Price Announcement protocol has multiple stages 
where price announcements made in an earlier stage restrict the announcements that can 
be made in the current stage. A Strategy Announcement protocol has subjects announce 
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not a price but a strategy for the game or, more generally, some set of contingency plans. 
Finally, a Chat protocol allows for either oral or written communication using natural 
language with minimal restrictions though typically prohibiting a subject from revealing 
his or her identity. 
The following results are distilled from the experimental literature using those commu-
nication protocols (and when no communication is allowed). We have noted papers that tested 
for the hypothesized behavior though not every paper finds evidence supportive of the noted 
regularity. 
1. Without communication, prices above static Nash equilibrium levels commonly oc- 
cur when there are two sellers but very rarely occur with more than two sellers. 
(Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Huck, Normann, and Oechssler, 2004; Engel, 2007; 
Rojas, 2012; Friedman, Huck, Oprea, and Weidenholzer, 2015) 
2. Compared to prices when sellers do not communicate, allowing sellers to announce 
prices results in initially higher prices but then prices decline to levels mildly above or 
close to levels when communication is prohibited. (Holt and Davis, 1990; Cason, 1995; 
Cason and Davis, 1995; Harstad, Martin, and Normann 1998; Hinloopen and Soetevent, 
2008; Bigoni et al, 2012; Cooper and Ku¨hn, 2014) 
3. Making communication costly tends to raise price. (Andersson and Wengström 
assume a cost per message, while Hinloopen 
(2007) and Andersson and Holm (2013) 
and Soetevent (2008) and Bigoni et al (2012) assume probabilistic penalties from all 
firms agreeing to communicate.) 
4. Compared to prices when sellers do not communicate, chat produces significantly 
higher prices which persist over time. (Friedman, 1967; Issac and Plott, 1981; Issac, 
Ramey, and Williams, 1984; Davis and Holt, 1998; Dijkstra, Haan, and Schoonbeek, 
2011; Fonseca and Normann, 2012; Cooper and Ku¨hn, 2014) 
5. Compared to when firms are symmetric, asymmetric costs result in lower prices. 
(Mason, Phillips, and Nowell, 1992; Mason and Phillips, 1997; Fonseca and Nor-mann, 
2008; Dugar and Mitra, 2009; Argenton and Mu¨ller, 2012) 
Pertinent to the current study, the literature has not addressed the following questions: 
 What is the effect of firm heterogeneity on the efficacy of communication? 
 What is the effect of firm heterogeneity and the number of firms on the efficacy of 
unrestricted communication compared to price announcements? 
 Do price announcements allow firms (whether symmetric or 
tively collude when there are more than two firms? 
asymmetric) to effec- 
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3 Experimental Design 
The experimental setting is a variant of the Bertrand price game in which sellers make 
posted offers, have homogeneous products, and may have different cost functions. In 
each period, a seller chooses a price and an upper bound on how much it is willing to 
produce and sell (this choice variable will allow sellers to allocate demand). The horizon is 
indefinite and the history is common knowledge. Section 3.1 provides a detailed 
description of the setting. A summary of the equilibrium properties for the game are 
provided in Section 3.2. The various treatments are described in Section 3.3, and the 
procedures deployed in conducting the experiments are summarized in Section 3.4. 
3.1 Environment 
Sellers offer identical products and face market demand D (P) = 150 − P with 150 com-
puterized buyers.
4 
The experiment consists of a multi-period posted-offer market with m 
participants playing the role of sellers. At the beginning of the experiment, subjects are 
randomly matched in groups of m people and the match is kept fixed throughout the 
session. Subjects are told that a session will last for at least 40 periods after which there 
is an 80% chance in each period of the session continuing to the subsequent period.
5
 
Each seller’s cost function is a step-function with the low cost step equalling 10 and 
the high cost step equalling 54. Seller i is assigned kiL low cost units and kiH high cost  
units so the cost function is 
Ci (q) f 
10q if q ∈  
{0 ,1 
, ... , kiL } 
 10kiL + 54 (q  − kiL) if q ∈  {kiL + 
1 
, ... , kiL + kiH } 
In all treatments, industry capacity is fixed at 24 units of low cost capacity and 180 units of 
high cost capacity, while the allocation of those units across sellers varies across 
treatments (and will be described later). Thus, market demand and the industry cost 
curve are as depicted in Figure 1 
In each period, subjects simultaneously choose a price and a maximal quantity (to be 
sold). A subject’s total number of units produced and sold equals the minimum of its 
demand and the maximal quantity it selected. Subjects are told that low cost units will be 
sold first, and any excess demand will not be carried over to the next period. Sellers only 
incur costs for the units sold. Subjects have 60 seconds to select a price and a maximal 
quantity, and there is only one price-maximal quantity offer posted by a subject in each 
period. If a subject chose not to post an offer then s/he earns zero profits for that period.
6 
Once subjects post their price-maximal quantity offers, the market clears. Buyers first 
purchase from the low price seller until demand or the low price seller’s maximal quantity is 
reached. If there is any residual demand, the process is repeated for the next lowest price 
seller and this process continues until all demand is met at the prevailing prices or 
maximal quantities are achieved. Buyers only purchase units if the price is equal to or 
4There is one buyer with a valuation of 150, one with a valuation of 149, and so 
forth. 5The shortest session ran for 40 periods while the longest one lasted for 53 
periods. 6A seller posted an offer more than 98% of the time. 
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(Notes to Editor: Print this graph in B&W.) 
Figure 1: Industry Cost and Demand 
below their valuation for those units. In case of a tie, the system alternates between sellers - 
buying a single unit from each seller (with identical prices) - until all available units are 
exhausted. Subjects are informed about the tie-breaking rule and that the buyers are 
computerized. 
At the end of a period, each subject learns the price-maximal quantity offers of all 
subjects in their group as well as all subjects’ results in terms of units sold and profit 
earned. They can also review the entire history at any point in time. The environment that 
subjects face is common knowledge; in particular, they all know market demand, the 
number of sellers, and each seller’s cost function. Subjects are provided with a profit 
calculator where they can input price-maximal quantity offers for all sellers and learn the 
resulting profits. They are told: 
others’) profits. To do so you can input your price and quantity and make guesses for the 
”The profit calculator allows you to estimate your (and 
other sellers.” 
The asymmetric treatment involves two firms. One subject is randomly selected to be 
firm 1 which is given more units of low cost capacity than the other subject playing firm 2, 
and these roles are kept fixed throughout a session. For all firms, the amount of low cost 
capacity is set sufficiently low so that each firm’s capacity is used up at the static Nash 
equilibria and at the joint profit maximum. As shown below, this specification has two 
implications. First, firms have the same ordering over a common price and, in particular, 
agree that the best common price is 102. Second, the static Nash equilibria are the same 
in both the symmetric and asymmetric treatments. 
As the two-step marginal cost function departs from the standard specification, let us 
conclude by highlighting several appealing properties of it. First, under the more common 
assumption of constant marginal cost, Nash equilibrium involves weakly dominated 
strategies when firms are symmetric which can cause unstable behavior. With the two-step 
marginal cost function, Nash equilibrium is not in weakly dominated strategies 
and firms earn positive profits. Second, under the assumption of constant marginal cost 
(with a finite price set), there are many Nash equilibria and this indeterminacy could con- 
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found the analysis when we compare results for symmetric and asymmetric cost functions. 
Third, by assuming that the cost asymmetry applies only to a small number of units, the 
set of static Nash equilibria with the two-step marginal cost function are identical for 
symmetric and asymmetric treatments, but collusive equilibria can differ (as we show in 
the next section). Thus, firm asymmetries are relevant only when firms try to collude, 
which is the focus of this study.
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3.2 Theory 
In the static game, a pure strategy is of the form (p, r) where p is a firm’s price and r is a 
firm’s maximal quantity. In characterizing equilibria for the static game, we will allow for 
mixed strategies. Let ri (p) denote the maximal quantity associated with firm i choosing 
price p (whether as part of a pure or mixed strategy). Note that when p > 54 (which, 
recall, is the cost of high cost capacity units), r i (p) 
as it is as least as large as residual demand. In addition, setting the maximal quantity at 
least as large as market demand D (p) weakly dominates setting it below market demand. 
We will focus on Nash equilibria in which ri (p) ~ D (p) when p ~ 54. 
is part of an optimal strategy as long 
The following proposition holds for the parametric assumptions in the experiment.
8
 
  
Proposition 1 Consider a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which ri (p) ~ D (p) Vp ~ 
54 in the support of firm i’s 
prices in {54, 55}. 
 strategy, V i . Each firm’s strategy assigns probability one to    
The set of Nash equilibria underlying Proposition 1 is composed of all firms pricing at 54, 
all firms pricing at 55, and firms randomizing over 54 and 55. Thus, the ”competitive 
price” is 54-55. 
Turning to the indefinite horizon repeated game, there are obviously many subgame 
perfect equilibria. To gain some insight, suppose sellers settle on the Nash Bargaining 
Solution when the choice set is composed of all stationary outcome paths implementable 
using the grim punishment.
9 
Let us further limit our attention to firms choosing a com-
mon price but possibly setting maximal quantities in order to unequally allocate market 
demand. In this case, it can be shown that firm heterogeneity does not matter in that the 
resulting outcome is symmetric. 
Proposition 2 The Nash Bargaining Solution for the set of outcomes sustainable by grim  
 
7Some readers have expressed concern that the experimental setting may be too complex because, in 
contrast to the usual modeling of Bertrand price competition, marginal cost is a step function and subjects 
choose a maximal quantity as well as price. In a footnote at the beginning of Section 4.3, we note that 
experimental output is consistent with subjects understanding the market setting as reflected 
in profit-maximizing behavior. 
8All results in this section are proven and discussed more extensively in Harrington, Hernan-Gonzalez, 
and Kujal (2013) and are available in the Online Appendix. 
9This specification was used in Harrington (1991) for the duopoly case when k1'= 0 and k2' = co 
(that is, constant marginal cost that differs between firms). Also see Miklós-Thal (2011) where optimal 
punishments are considered. 
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subgame perfect equilibria is symmetric. 
While firms’ traits then need not affect collusive behavior, this was shown for just one 
possible specification of collusion. If an equilibrium has all firms producing at least as 
much as its low cost capacity (for all histories) then the equilibrium condi tions are 
independent of the amount of low cost capacity. However, consider a strategy profile in 
which the punishment has the deviator sell zero for some number of periods and, after 
doing so, there is a return to the collusive outcome. Now equilibrium conditions depend on 
a firm’s low cost capacity because a firm with more low cost capacity foregoes more profit 
when it produces zero. By affecting the set of equilibrium outcomes from which the 
cartel selects, firms’ traits may then result in an asymmetric outcome. 
To pursue this latter point, consider the following strategy profile where the collusive  
’s share of market demand is s i. If a outcome has all firms set a common price and firm i 
firm deviates from the outcome path, suppose that the punishment has the deviator choose 
(p, r) (55, D (55)) and the non-deviators choose (p, r) (54, D (54)) for one period   - 
so the deviator sells zero and the non-deviators share market demand at a price of 54 - and 
then there is a return to the collusive outcome. This punishment applies whether a firm 
deviates from the original collusive path or the punishment path. Considering this 
strategy proifle at the joint proift maximizing price of 102 and assuming capacities for the 
asymmetric duopoly treatment - (k1L k2L )= (18, 6) - it can be shown that all equilibrium 
conditions are satisfied if and only if s1 ≥ .403 and s2 ≥ .504.Thus, a higher market share 
for the high cost firm may be required in order to sustain collusion. 
  
Though our analysis of dynamic equilibria is limited, there are two useful takeaways.  
First, there is a wide class of scenarios whereby the collusive outcome is symmetric even 
when firms have different cost functions. If firms focus on equilibria in which they always 
produce at least as much as their low cost capacity (such as with symmetric equilibria 
constructed on the grim punishment) and the selection of an outcome does not depend on 
relative profits then the prediction is that the collusive outcome will involve equal market 
shares. Second, scenarios have been identified whereby the collusive outcome has the firm 
with fewer units of low cost capacity assigned a higher market share. If the punishment used 
in equilibrium has the deviator produce zero (for some length of time), it is the 
higher cost firm’s equilibrium condition that is most stringent which means it will need to 
have more market share. 
3.3 Treatments 
There are three treatment variables: number of firms, seller cost heterogeneity, and com-
munication. The number of firms varied between 2 3 and 4. In the symmetric treatment, 
, ,  
 
all sellers have the same number of low cost and high cost units. The asymmetric treat - 
ment - which was run only for the case of a duopoly - assumes that both firms have total 
capacity of 102 units with firm 1 having 18 units of low cost capacity and firm 2 having 
6 units of low cost capacity. The various treatments with regards to the number of firms 
and cost conditions is shown in the bottom row of Table 1. Finally, there are three 
communication treatments: 
 No Communication: Sellers cannot communicate in any form with their rivals.  
9 
 
 
 
= 
 
 
= 
 
 
Sellers simultaneously choose price-maximal quantity offers and have a maximum of 60 
seconds to make a decision. If offers are made earlier, the system immediately 
determines the market outcome and informs sellers of the outcome. Sellers also have the 
option of not posting an offer by clicking on the “Do not send an offer” button. Sellers 
have access to the entire history. 
 Price Announcement: Sellers are informed that each period of the session consists  
of two stages. In the first stage (Price Announcement), sellers simultaneously choose (or 
not) to make a single non-binding price announcement regarding the price they will 
select in the market competition stage. Thus, communication between sellers is 
exclusively numeric and no additional information can be transmitted. Price 
announcements are simultaneously released to the other sellers. All sellers know 
that all price announcements are non-binding, and that they can choose not to 
make an announcement. 
immediately goes to the second stage if all announcements are made before the time 
limit. As in the No Communication treatment, the second stage has them 
simultaneously make price-maximal quantity offers. All information is common and 
sellers have access to the entire history, including all sellers’ announcements.  
10 While the first stage can last for up to 60 seconds, it  
 Chat: Sellers are informed that each period of the session consists of two stages. In  
the first stage, they can participate in an online chat room where they communicate 
with the other seller(s) for 60 seconds. The communication protocol is explicitly ex-
plained to the participants: “You are free to discuss any aspects of the experiment, 
with the following exceptions: you may not reveal your name, discuss side payments 
outside the laboratory, or engage in inappropriate language (including such shorthand 
as ‘WTF’). If you do, you will be excused and you will not be paid.” As in the No 
Communication treatment, the second stage has them simultaneously make price-
maximal quantity offers. Sellers have access to the entire history, including all 
sellers’ messages. 
The No Communication treatment describes the usual environment in which firms can only 
coordinate by signaling through their actual transaction prices. The Price Announcement 
treatment captures a feature of some markets in which firms can make non-binding 
announcements about future prices. For example, advance price announcements have been 
deployed and argued to have produced supracompetitive prices in steel (Scherer, 1980), 
airlines (Borenstein, 2004), and diesel and petrol fuel in Taiwan (Fair Trade Commission, 
2004). 11 The Price Announcement treatment is designed to give firms an instrument by  
which to coordinate that is short of express communication. The issue is whether price  
'°A seller can either click the button ”Do not send an announcement” or not submit an announcement  
and wait until the end of the announcement period. 
''In our experiment, price announcements can only affect seller behavior because buyers are simulated 
and, even if buyers were live, they would be irrelevant to buyer behavior. It is then best to think of the 
Price Announcement treatment as relevant to markets in which these announcements are not received by 
buyers (for example, they occur through a trade association) or where such information is of little value 
to buyers.  
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Communication Protocol 
Symmetric Asymmetric 
m = 2 m = 3 m = 4 m = 2 
Cost Treatments (ksL ks" (12, 90) (8, 60) (6, 45) (18, 84) , (6, 96) 
 
Table 1: Experimental Treatments 
announcements are sufficiently informative to induce coordinated behavior.
12
 Finally, the 
Chat treatment models explicit collusion in that firms can engage in unrestricted com-
munication in order to coordinate on a collusive outcome and engage in an exchange of 
assurances. 
Table 1 summarizes the different combination of treatments used in the experiment  
along with the notation we will use when referring to the treatment. In brackets [ ] is the 
number of sessions run with that treatment. Given the large number of possible 
combinations, the number of sellers-firm heterogeneity treatments were chosen to make 
the best use of our budget by avoiding treatments that were unlikely to provide new 
information. For example, if m firms for a treatment yielded competitive results then we 
did not run the treatment with more than m firms as it is likely to produce compet itive 
results. 
3.4 Procedures 
Our subject pool consisted of students from Chapman University which is a major Amer-
ican university with a diverse population. Participants were recruited by email from a pool 
of more than 2,000 students who had signed up to participate in experiments. Emails were 
sent to a randomly selected subset of the pool of students. Subjects were recruited for a 
total of two hours. The experiments took place in May 2011. In total, 242 students  
participated in 73 duopoly, 16 triopoly and 12 quadropoly experiments. 
The instructions were displayed on subjects’ computer screens and they were told that 
all screens displayed the same set of instructions. They had exactly 20 minutes to read the 
instructions (which are provided in the Online Appendix). A 20-minute timer was shown 
on the laboratory screen. Three minutes before the end of the instructions period, a 
monitor entered the room announcing the time remaining and handing out a printed copy 
of the summary of the instructions. None of the participants asked for extra time to read 
the instructions. At the end of the 20-minute instruction round, the experimenter closed the 
instructions file from the server, and subjects typed their names to start the session. The 
interaction between the experimenter and the participants was negligible.  
The show-up fee was $7.00 and average payoffs (including the show-up fee) varied from 
12We intentionally did not allow firms to also announce maximal quantities because such quantity 
announcements are very uncommon though have occurred in the automobile industry (Doyle and Snyder, 
1999). 
11 
No Communication SNC2 [12] SNC3 [8]   ANC2 [13] 
Price Announcements SAN2 [12] SAN3 [8] SAN4 [6] AAN2 [12] 
Chat SCH2 [12]   SCH4 [6] ACH2 [12] 
 
 
 
  
a low of $18.85 (which was for triopoly with the No Communication treatment) to a high 
of $34.35 (which was for duopoly with the Chat treatment). 
4 Results 
Our interest is understanding the conditions under which subjects settle down on a col-
lusive equilibrium. When collusion does emerge, we do not generally expect it to occur 
immediately for a subject may go through a learning phase as she seeks to become better 
informed about the market environment and other subjects’ strategies. For this reason, 
results are reported for periods 1-20, 21-40, and 1-40.
13
 We expect results for periods 21-
40 to be most informative and, in fact, there is evidence of learning in the early periods as 
revealed both through choices and in the messages from the Chat treatment. 
4.1 Baseline: No Communication 
Let us begin by considering the benchmark protocol of No Communication (NC). Table 2 
reports the mean, median, and standard deviation of average market price.
14
 We test 
whether market prices are equal to (or exceed) the competitive price using a non-
parametric test in light of the small number of observations and that market price is not 
normally distributed.
15
 Mean and median market price exceed 55 in all treatments so it 
is at least as high as the static Nash equilibrium price of 54-55. Average market price is 
significantly higher for symmetric duopoly with a price of 69.5 (p-value .003) and for  
asymmetry duopoly with a price of 63.0 (p-value = .011). In contrast, the average market 
price for symmetric triopoly is 56.3 which is very close to the competitive price (p-value 
.363).  
Consistent with previous findings in the experimental literature, supracompetitive 
prices occur with two sellers but not with three sellers. We also find for the case of a 
duopoly that prices are higher when firms’ cost functions are identical though it is only 
barely statistically significant. For periods 1-40, prices are higher under symmetry by 
8.5% (p-value = .103; see Table 4), and are higher for periods 21-40 by 10.3% (p-value  
.128). 
Result 1: For the case of no communication, average market price exceeds the competi-
tive level in duopoly (symmetric and asymmetric) but not in triopoly (symmetric). 
For the case of duopoly and no communication, average market price is higher when 
13Recall that the length of the horizon is 40 periods for sure and is then stochastically terminated.  
There was no evidence of end-game effects before or after period 40. 
14The market price is the sum of firms’ prices weighted by the firm’s market shares, and the average 
market price for a group is the market price averaged across all periods (and is the unit of observation 
for calculating the statistics in Table 2). 
15The histograms on market price are available in the Online Appendix. A one-sided sign test is used for 
which the null hypothesis is median market price = 55 and the alternative hypothesis is median market 
price> 55. Given that theory predicts that price will not be less than the static Nash equilibrium price but 
could exceed it, a one-sided test seems appropriate. 
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firms have identical cost functions than when they have different cost functions 
(though the difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels). 
4.2 Signaling: Price Announcements 
In assessing the effect of the communication protocol on behavior and how its effect 
depends on market structure, it is important to note that collusion is more than high prices; 
it is a mutual understanding among firms to coordinate their behavior which is formally 
expressed as a collusive equilibrium for an indefinite horizon game. Prices could be high 
and yet firms may not be colluding. For example, firms may periodically raise price in order 
to attempt to coordinate a move to a collusive equilibrium but never succeed in doing so; 
high average prices are then the product of failed attempts to collude. Or sellers may 
engage in randomized pricing that periodically results in high prices - thus producing high 
average prices - but again there is not the regularity in prices one would typically associate 
with a collusive equilibrium. In the ensuing analysis, sellers will be said to be colluding 
when prices are high and follow some stable pattern. This could mean consistently setting 
identical prices and equally sharing demand. Or firms could consistently set different prices 
with the firm with the lower (but still high) price restricting its supply so that the firm with 
the higher price has residual demand. Or firms could alternate over time with one firm 
selling to the market and the other firm pricing itself out of the market or not participating. 
Recognizing the different forms that supracompetitive 
outcomes can take, various measures will be used in our analysis. 
As an initial step, let us focus on collusion that takes the form of firms setting identical 
supracompetitive prices. To identify the extent to which price announcements results in 
such an outcome, we will report average market price and two measures of coordination: 
the number of periods for which sellers set the same price exceeding the competitive price 
(Same) and the longest number of consecutive periods for which sellers set identical prices 
(Duration). Sellers achieving a high average price and high measures of Same and Duration 
is compelling evidence that they are colluding. If sellers achieve a high average price and 
low measures of coordination then it could either be that firms are not colluding 
or are colluding in a different manner. 
In going from the No Communication to the Price Announcement treatment, Table 2 
reports that the average market price under duopoly substantially increases, whether 
firms are symmetric or asymmetric. Using a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test (see Table 4), 
this difference is statistically significant for asymmetric duopolies (e.g., p-value .004  
for periods 1-40) but only marginally so for symmetric duopolies (e.g., p-value  .133 
for periods 1-40). Though the increase in average price is actually larger in absolute and 
percentage terms when firms are symmetric, the standard deviation is much larger. We 
will return to this point later. 
Having the ability to make price announcements proves insufficient to produce col-
lusion when there are more than two firms. For symmetric triopolies, average price is 57.7 
(periods 21-40) which is close to average price without announcements (56.3) and to the 
competitive price (54-55). Similar results were found in six sessions conducted with four 
symmetric firms. In sum, price announcements matter when there are two sellers - 
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whether symmetric or asymmetric - but not when there are more than two sellers. 
One of the most robust findings in the experimental literature on collusion is that, in  
the absence of communication, three or more firms very rarely collude. Our results show 
this result to be robust to allowing communication to occur through price announcements. 
There is a fundamental difference in the strategic uncertainty faced by two firms and by 
more than two firms. With a duopoly, a firm that announces a high price need only 
convince the other firm that it intends to set a high price in order to induce that rival firm 
to also set a high price. But that is insufficient when there are three firms. The 
announcement of a high price by firm 1 may convince firms 2 and 3 that firm 1 intends to 
raise price but firm 2 may be uncertain as to whether firm 3 drew the same inference and 
thus uncertain as to whether firm 3 will raise price. Our results suggest that price 
announcements are inadequate for surmounting the challenge of higher order  
beliefs necessary to achieve collusion when there are more than two firms. 
While price announcements are producing higher average prices for duopolies, have 
firms coordinated on a stable pattern of prices? Examining the coordination measures in 
Table 3, there is more than a doubling in the number of periods in which firms in a 
symmetric duopoly set identical prices, as it increases from 5.3 to 13.0. It is even more 
impressive if we focus on periods 21-40 where the frequency of identical prices rises from 
18% of the time to almost 45%. Furthermore, this higher frequency of equal prices is time-
dependent: Probit regressions show that the probability that firms’ prices are identical in 
the current period is higher when they were identical in the previous period.
16
 The Duration 
measure tells the same story, as the average maximal number of consecutive periods for 
which firms set the same price goes from 2-3 to 7-8 periods. In contrast, price 
announcements do not produce any increase in the coordination measures when firms are 
asymmetric. Though the differences for symmetric firms are not statistically significant by 
the usual standards (see Table 4), the evidence is suggestive that price announcements  
are producing more coordination for symmetric duopolies. 
Of course, the lack of evidence for increased coordination in asymmetric duopolies 
may just reflect the inadequacy of our measures. Same and Duration are designed to 
detect coordination on identical prices. Perhaps, due to cost differences, asymmetric 
duopolies collude with different prices and choose maximal quantities so as to allocate 
market demand, or instead alternate in supplying the entire market. If firms have settled 
down to such supracompetitive outcomes then this will be reflected in high and stable 
industry profit. 
Figures 2 and 3 report the mean and standard deviation of industry profit over periods 21-
40 for asymmetric and symmetric duopolies, respectively, and for both the No 
 17 Collusion is associated with the  
16A series of probit regressions were run where the dependent variable was a dummy for whether both 
firms in the market set the same price (above 55) or not, and have the one-period lag of the dependent 
variable as the regressor. The estimated coefficient on the regressor is always positive and significant in 
all of the duopoly treatments (all p-values < 0.05), for periods 1-40. Similar results occur for periods 21-
40 (all p-values < 0.029), except for treatments SNC2 and AAN2. These results are available in the 
Online Appendix. 
17The joint profit maximum yields profit of 3360, while industry profit is 1056 when all firms set a  
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Communication and Price Announcement treatments. 
northwest quadrant where industry profit is high with low volatility. Examining Figure 2, 
price announcements raise average industry profit for asymmetric duopolies but there are 
no observations of high and stable profit (relative to when firms are not permitted to make 
price announcements). In contrast, price announcements result in noticeably higher and 
less variable profit for one-third of the symmetric duopolies. For those four duopolies, 
industry profit is higher and the standard deviation is lower than in any of the 12 
symmetric duopolies in the No Communication treatment. This evidence is consistent with 
price announcements increasing the extent of collusion for symmetric duopolies but not 
for asymmetric duopolies.
18
 
Result 2: When firms can make price announcements then - compared to no communi- 
cation - firms in a duopoly set higher prices whether they are symmetric or asym-
metric, but firms coordinate more only when they are symmetric. When there are 
more than two firms, price announcements do not result in supracompetitive prices.  
There is a rather natural explanation for why price announcements are more effective in 
producing collusion when firms are symmetric. When sellers have identical cost functions, 
a symmetric supracompetitive outcome is focal, and can be implemented by coordinating 
on identical prices. However, when sellers have different cost functions, a symmetric 
outcome is no longer focal. An asymmetric outcome could be produced in a variety of 
ways but arguably the most straightforward is for sellers to set identical prices and 
unequally allocate market demand, which is what has been done with many cartels 
(Harrington, 2006). For example, if sellers wanted to support the joint profit maximum and 
have the high cost seller receive 60% of market demand, both sellers could charge the 
monopoly price of 102, which yields market demand of 48, and have the low cost seller set 
its maximal quantity equal to 19, which will result in the high cost seller supplying the 
residual demand of 29. However, this collusive outcome requires coordination of prices 
and quantities. The difficulty in coordinating on equal prices and unequal quantities in the 
Price Announcement treatment is that sellers are only allowed to announce prices. Of 
course, just because an asymmetric outcome may be the most desirable collusive outcome 
for an asymmetric duopoly, it does not imply that firms would try to coordinate on it. If it 
is perceived to be too difficult then they could decide to coordinate on identical prices and 
equally share market demand; some collusion is better than competition. However, that is 
not what we are finding. Under asymmetric duopoly, sellers are not coordinating 
on a common price. 
To complement the preceding nonparametric analysis, panel data regressions were  
conducted to measure the effect on market price of the communication protocols and  
cost structures. The empirical model is: pi,t = µo + βXit + ei,t
where 
pi,t is the market 
price in group i in period t and Xit are dummy variables for each treatment. Similar 
, 
to previous studies, we allow for serial autocorrelation of the disturbance.
19 
The model 
, 
price of 54. 
18These measures look at the mean and standard deviation for periods 21-40. A duopoly could succeed  
in colluding late in the horizon and thereby fail to have a high stable profit in this 20 period window.  
Inspection of the time series for all of the groups reveals only two such cases.  
19See Mason, Phillips and Nowell (1992), Mason and Phillips (1997), and Argenton and Mu¨ller (2012).  
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was estimated for duopolies and for periods 1-20, 21-40, and 1-40. In Table 5, DAnn is 
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the Price Announcement treatment (and 
value 0 for the No Communication treatment), DAsym is a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 for the asymmetric cost treatment, and we also have an interaction term for  
the communication and cost treatments. 
Confirming Result 2, the coefficient on DAsym is negative (and significant except for 
periods 1-20) indicating that, when communication is prohibited, prices are lower when firms 
are asymmetric. Permitting firms to make price announcements raises price by 10 for 
symmetric duopolies and 7.64 for asymmetric duopolies (using the estimated coefficients for 
periods 21-40). While the negative coefficient on the interaction term DAnn x DAsym is 
consistent with the claim that indirect communication through price announcements is 
a more effective collusive device when firms are symmetric, it is not significant. 
Let us now return to the issue of the high standard deviation for average market price 
for a symmetric duopoly under the Price Announcement treatment (see Table 2). An 
inspection of the price paths for individual groups reveal that, under symmetric duopoly,  
sellers either set high identical prices (5 out of 12 groups) or prices near competitive levels 
with some unsuccessful forays into supracompetitive territory (5 out of 12 groups).  
this dichotomy in outcomes which we believe is responsible for the high standard deviation: 
Either firms have great success in colluding or very little success. Such a property is not 
found for the case of asymmetric duopoly. These claims are supported by Figure 4 where an 
observation is a group’s average market price and the number of periods for which firms set 
the same price. When firms are symmetric, the observations form two (circled) clumps; one 
with low price and low coordination, and the other with high price and high coordination 
(with the exception of one group with high price and low coordination). Note that the lowest 
average price for the groups in the ”high Same” clump exceeds the highest average price for 
the groups in the ”low Same” clump. Also, 5 out of the 12 symmetric duopoly groups have 
average price close to the monopoly price of 102. When firms are asymmetric, there is no 
apparent relationship between average price and the frequency 
20 It is 
with which firms set the same price. 
Summarizing this section, the ability to make non-binding price announcements pro-
duces more collusion - as reflected in stable supracompetitive outcomes - only for sym-
metric duopolies. For symmetric duopolies, if price announcements are able to produce 
collusion then the collusion is often near-maximal in that sellers consistently set prices near 
the monopoly level. While price announcements do raise average prices for asymmetric 
duopolies, there is little evidence that sellers are coordinating; they do not set common 
prices, and an examination of profit does not support coordination on an asymmetric 
outcome. 
4.3 Express Communication: Chat 
Turning to the Chat treatment, collusion is rampant; sellers set high and identical prices  
most of the time and in almost all groups. From Table 2 for the symmetric case, average  
20Price paths for all 12 groups are available in the Online Appendix.  
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price is 91.2 over periods 1-40 (which is 77% of the gap between the competitive and 
monopoly prices) and is 98.9 over periods 21-40 (93% of the gap). Even more impressive, 
the median price is the monopoly price of 102 (periods 21-40). Prices are just as high when 
the duopoly has asymmetric firms with an average price of 91.2 for periods 1-40 and an 
average price of 99.5 for periods 21-40. Finally, when there are more than two sellers, 
chat is producing near-monopoly prices, while prices are close to competitive levels when 
sellers could only make price announcements. 21,22 
We previously noted that, when sellers are symmetric, coordination is higher with 
price announcements compared to when there is no communication, and we find that 
they are yet higher when sellers can chat. From Table 3, the percentage of periods for 
which symmetric sellers set the same price (during periods 21-40) is 18% with no 
communication, almost 50% with price announcements, and more than 90% with chat. 
Furthermore, there was near-perfect collusion in 11 of the 12 groups as firms charged 
identical prices starting in period 27 (or earlier) and the average market price was between 
97 and 102. When sellers are asymmetric, the percentage of periods for which sellers set 
the same price (during periods 21-40) is 9-15% with either no communication or price announcements 
and rises to almost 55% with chat. 
However, that measure understates the extent of collusion because some groups co-
ordinated on different prices. Table 6 reports summary statistics for the 12 asymmetric 
groups with chat (for periods 21-40). Seven groups coordinated on identical prices near 
the monopoly level and another three groups coordinated on different prices (as revealed 
by inspecting the price and quantity paths). Sellers in group 2 alternated between a price 
just above 145 and a price of 145 so they took turns selling at 145 (which actually resulted 
in low profit because price was too high). Group 6 settled down to a stationary outcome 
in which the low cost seller prices at 90 and the high cost seller prices at 82 and limits its 
supply to 42 so that the low cost seller has residual demand of 18. This outcome allowed 
them to earn the same high profit. Finally, sellers in group 10 alternated between a price of 
102 and not posting a price so that each earned monopoly profit every other period.
23
 
Result 3: When sellers can engage in chat then - compared to either no communication 
or price announcements - sellers set higher prices and coordinate more, whether 
they are symmetric or asymmetric and whether there are two sellers or more than 
two sellers. With chat, prices are often at or near monopoly levels. 
Table 7 reports estimates from panel data regressions which allow us to compare the 
efficacy of communicating through chat with non-binding price announcements. Express 
21Jn Table 2, prices for four symmetric sellers in the Chat treatment far exceed the prices for three  
symmetric sellers in the Price Announcements treatment. 
22With regards to the earlier expressed concern that the experimental setting may be too complex, 
subjects’ behavior does not support that concern. As just noted for the Chat treatment, the median price is 
at or very close to the monopoly price which indicates that they have solved the joint profit maximization 
problem. For the No Communication treatment, results are consistent with previous experiments in that 
market price for two subjects exceeds the static Nash equilibrium price, while market price for three or 
more subjects is close to the static Nash equilibrium price. 
23Group 4 also had a high average market price but their conduct did not settle down to any recognizable 
pattern. 
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communication significantly raises price. When firms are symmetric, price is higher by 
19.43 and, when firms are asymmetric, the price increase is 28.71 (using the estimated 
coefficients for periods 21-40). The positive coefficient for the interaction term supports 
the claim that direct communication through chat is a more effective collusive device when 
firms are asymmetric, compared to price announcements. Thus, the incremental value to 
directly, as opposed to indirectly, communicating, is greater when firms have different cost 
functions. 
Result 4: For the case of duopoly, the incremental effect on price of chat compared  
to price announcements is greater when firms are asymmetric than when they are 
symmetric. 
5 Concluding Remarks 
The primary objectives of this project are to investigate: 1) the efficacy of non-binding 
price announcements in producing collusion; 2) the efficacy of unrestricted communica-
tion relative to price announcements in producing collusion, and 3) how the answers to 
those first two questions depend on market structure in terms of firm asymmetries and the 
number of firms. One main finding is that price announcements clearly increase the 
frequency of collusion for a symmetric duopoly but do not facilitate collusion when firms 
are asymmetric or there are more than two firms. The near-universal experimental finding 
that it is very difficult for three or more firms to coordinate on high prices when there is no 
communication is shown to be robust to allowing firms to communicate through price 
announcements. Though price announcements do raise average price with asymmetric 
duopolies, there is little evidence that they are able to generate stable supracompetitive 
outcomes. Regarding the efficacy of unrestricted communication, it is highly effective in 
producing collusion whether firms are identical or not and regardless of the number of 
firms. For all cases, prices and profits are significantly higher when sellers can engage in 
express communication compared to when only price announcements are available. The 
incremental gain of direct communication (through chat) compared to indirect commu-
nication (through price announcements) is large for all market structures but especially 
when firms are asymmetric and when there are more than two firms. 
Our experimental evidence is consistent with the following two hypotheses. First, in -
direct communication through price announcements is sufficient for producing collusion in 
symmetric duopolies. Second, reasonably direct communication is required to produce 
collusion when firms are asymmetric or there are more than two firms. The evidence for 
that hypothesis is that collusion was widely observed when firms engage in online chat, 
while price announcements rarely resulted in collusion when there were more than two 
firms or firms had different cost functions. Of course, there are other forms of indirect 
communication which may succeed where price announcements failed. Also, while price 
announcements produced little collusion for asymmetric duopolies, higher prices were ob-
served which may indicate failed attempts at colluding. Perhaps the addition of quantity 
announcements would be sufficient to result in collusion in that case, or allowing firms to 
announce strategies. At the same time, the asymmetry in our experiment is very mild so 
18 
 
it is rather striking that price announcements are insufficient for coordination. In actual 
markets, firms are substantively asymmetric, yet it seems that price announcements have 
worked; for example, in the airlines industry. There is then a gap between what is being 
found experimentally and what has occurred in actual markets. 
In terms of future research, there is more to be done in allowing for different firm 
asymmetries and communication protocols. The cost asymmetry could be made more 
extensive by assuming it applies to all units. Other forms of asymmetry to consider are 
capacity and product differentiation. It is especially important to investigate other types of 
non-express means of communication such as the announcement by a seller of a strat- 
egy. Such messages were the basis for at least two Section 5 ”invitation to collude” cases 
24 Finally, some experi- 
pursued by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission in recent years.  
ments have allowed for probabilistic penalties in response to sellers choosing to engage in 
online chat, in order to simulate the penalties imposed by antitrust and competition law. 
Our design could be modified to make online chat an option. Sellers could then seek to 
”legally” collude through price announcements or 
This design would serve to identify the types of market structures for which sellers opt  
”illegally” collude through online chat. 
for express communication. 
24In the Matter of Valassis Communications, Inc., File No. 051 0008, Docket No. C-4160, April 28, 2006; and 
U-Haul International, Inc. Docket No. C-4294 Complaint, July 14, 2010. 
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Table 2: Average Market Price 
Average (Median) [Std. Dev] Market Price 
N o  C o m m u n i c a t i o n   
S N C 2  A N C 2  S N C 3  
Price Announcements 
AAN2 SAN3 
Chat 
Periods SAN2 SAN4 SCH2 ACH2 SCH4 
66.7 61.5 58.5 76.2 67.5 58.0 61.2 91.2 91.2 89.6 
1-40 (63.4) (57.8) (56.8) (72.6) (65.7) (55.7) (61.0) (92.7) (90.4) (94.7) 
[11.8] [10.9] [8.1] [17.6] [5.9] [4.6] [7.4] [12.5] [17.6] [17.1] 
64.0 60.0 60.7 72.9 64.4 58.3 63.2 83.5 82.7 85.7 
1-20 (61.3) (56.6) (56.0) (64.5) (64.3) (56.1) (63.9) (83.8) (83.5) (87.2) 
[11.7] [12.4] [15.9] [18.1] [7.3] [5.3] [8.8] [18.4] [20.2] [16.8] 
69.5 63.0 56.3 79.5 70.6 57.7 59.2 98.9 99.5 93.4 
21-40 (64.1) (56.9) (55.6) (76.5) (72.8) (55.8) (55.5) (102.0) (99.8) (102.0) 
[17.1] [14.3] [2.2] [20.2] [9.4] [4.3] [7.9] [8.6] [17.2] [18.5] 
Table 3: Coordination Measures (Duopoly)  
No Price 
Chat 
Communication Announcements 
Periods SNC2 ANC2 SAN2 AAN2 SCH2 ACH2 
1-40 5.3 4.0 13.0 4.3 29.5 17.7 
Number of periods with 
equal price (p>55) 
1-20 1.8 2.2 4.0 1.4 11.2 6.7 
21-40 3.5 1.8 9.0 2.9 18.3 11.0 
1-40 2.5 1.7 9.8 1.8 23.0 11.8 
Duration of Price  
coordination (p>55) 
1-20 1.0 1.3 2.7 0.8 8.5 5.2 
21-40 2.3 1.2 7.8 1.5 17.3 8.7 
 
Table 4: Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon Tests 
p-values for the test that the average Market Price, Same or Duration is the same across two treatments, 
for periods 1-40 (1-20) [21-40] 
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Average Market Price Same Duration 
SNC2 SAN2 .133 (.184) [.273] .368 (.549) [.170] .211 (.583) [.084] 
SCH2 <0.001 (.008) [<0.001] <0.001 (<0.001) [<0.001] <0.001 (.002) [<0.001] 
SNC3 .045 (.487) [.009] .015 (.213) [.014] .014 (.246) [.003] 
ANC2 .103 (.828) [.128] .225 (.955) [.095] .264 (.929) [.068] 
SAN2 SCH2 .057 (.184) [.022] .008 (.015) [.002] .009 (.010) [.002] 
SAN3 .009 (.031) [.005] .002 (.373) [<0.001] .004 (.368) [<0.001] 
SAN4 .039 (.454) [.011] .002 (.135) [.001] .003 (.148) [.001] 
AAN2 .525 (.453) [.419] .092 (.717) [.048] .114 (.925) [.047] 
SCH2 SCH4 .925 (>0.999) [.758] .963 (.706) [.210] .510 (.851) [.071] 
ACH2 .564 (.817) [.231] .046 (.111) [.011] .022 (.147) [.005] 
SNC3 SAN3 .916 (.674) [.529] .337 (.386) [.487] .143 (.333) [.535] 
SAN3 SAN4 .699 (.366) [>0.999] .330 (.370) [.386] .411 (.411) [.386] 
SAN4 SCH4 .016 (.025) [.006] .013 (.013) [.007] .013 (.013) [.007] 
ANC2 AAN2 .004 (.211) [.017] .825 (.737) [.519] .657 (.346) [.414] 
.008 (.093) [.005] ACH2 <0.001 (.002) [<0.001] .009 (.123) [.009] 
AAN2 ACH2 <0.001 (.008) [<0.001] .015 (.056) [.026] .015 (.032) [.025] 
SNC2 – Symmetric, No Communication, Duopoly 
SAN2 – Symmetric, Price Announcement, Duopoly 
SNC3 – Symmetric, No Communication, Triopoly 
SAN3 – Symmetric, Price Announcement, Triopoly 
SCH2 – Symmetric, Chat, Duopoly SCH4 - Symmetric, Chat, Quadropoly 
ANC2 – Asymmetric, No Communication, Duopoly 
ACH2 – Asymmetric, Chat, Duopoly 
AAN2 – Asymmetric, Price Announcement, Duopoly 
 
          
        
Table 5: Duopoly Market Price – No Communication vs. Price Announcements  
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
Periods: 1-20 21-40 1-40 
Constant 64.00*** 69.47*** 66.74*** 
(2.52) (2.07) (1.66) 
DAnn 8.93*** 10.00*** 9.46*** 
(3.46) (3.20) (2.40) 
DAsym -4.04 -6.46** -5.25** 
(3.26) (2.67) (2.15) 
DAnn x DAsym -4.48 -2.36 -3.42 
(4.27) (3.94) (2.97) 
F(3, 976) 5.80*** 10.59*** 
F(3, 1956) 14.89*** 
N 980 980 
DAnn is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if firms can make price announcements 
and value 0 otherwise. DAsym is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if firms cost 
functions are asymmetric and value 0 otherwise. Newey-West standard errors in 
parentheses. *p -value<.10, ** p-value<.05, and *** p-value<.01. 
Table 6: Asymmetric Duopoly with Chat (periods 21-40) 
Average Median 
Number of Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 (Low 
Group Market Market 
periods (Low cost) (High cost) cost) 
Price Price 
with equal Average Average Average 
price Profit Profit Market Share 
1 102.0 102.0 20 1944 1416 50% 
2 144.5 145.0 1 335 304 53% 
3 100.9 102.0 16 1629 1601 41% 
4 95.6 95.0 4 1148 1654 35% 
5 102.7 103.0 18 1753 1523 45% 
6 84.4 84.4 0 1440 1440 30% 
7 98.0 101.0 17 1603 1640 38% 
8 99.0 102.0 18 1904 1287 50% 
9 102.0 102.0 20 1944 1416 50% 
10 96.4 102.0 
11 
1428 1186 54% 
11 68.6 64.5 1057 555 56% 
12 100.6 99.0 16 1795 1451 47% 
19
60 
 
      
              
Table 7: Duopoly Market Price –Price Announcements vs. Chat 
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
Periods: 1-20 21-40 1-40 
Constant 72.93*** 79.47*** 76.20*** 
(2.37) (2.45) (1.74) 
DChat 10.38*** 19.43*** 14.97*** 
(3.83) (2.68) (2.43) 
DAsym -8.51*** -8.83*** -8.67*** 
(2.76) (2.90) (2.04) 
DChat x DAsym 7.85 9.28*** 8.53*** 
(4.91) (3.60) (3.19) 
F(3, 949) 19.05*** 
F(3, 955) 88.98*** 
F(3, 1908) 69.72*** 
N 
DChat is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if firms can chat and value 0 
otherwise. DAsym is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if firms cost functions are 
asymmetric and value 0 otherwise. Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. *p -
value<.10, ** p-value<.05, and *** p-value<.01. 
95
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Figure 2: Mean and Standard Deviation of Profit - Asymmetric Duopoly 
(No Communication and Price Announcement Treatments)  
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
    
 
  
 
Figure 3: Mean and Standard Deviation of Profit - Symmetric Duopoly 
(No Communication and Price Announcement Treatments)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
    
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
   
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 Figure 4: Average Market Price and Coordination (Same) 
Price Announcement: Symmetric and Asymmetric Duopolies  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
